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PRIVILEGE OF HUSBAND AND
WIFE: APPLICATION UNDER THE
MISSOURI DISSOLUTION STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri courts have long held that confidential communications
between a husband and wife are privileged.' Recent cases, however,
have recognized and expanded important exceptions to that privilege.
According to these cases, the confidential communications privilege does
not prevent one spouse from testifying as to personal communications
with the other, if that testimony deals primarily with property matters or
business dealings. 2
This comment will reexamine the need for the confidential com-
munications privilege between husband and wife in an action for disso-
lution of marriage. Discussion will center on the possibility that Mis-
souri's existing exceptions to the confidential communications privilege
make the privilege inapplicable in actions brought under the new Mis-
souri Divorce Act.3 The argument that the confidential communications
privilege should not be applied in divorce actions will be based on: 1) the
relationship between the existing exceptions to the privilege and the new
concepts of property division and partnership theory of marriage which
exist under the new divorce act; and 2) the tendency of Missouri courts
to limit the confidential communications privilege whenever possible.
II. HUSBAND-WIFE WITNESS PRIVILEGE
Before discussing the possible exceptions to the confidential com-
munications privilege, it may be helpful to define the privilege as it
exists in Missouri and to distinguish it from other husband-wife witness
privileges.
1. Moore v. Moore, 51 Mo. 118 (1872).
2. Durr v. Vick, 345 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1961); Brooks v. Brooks, 357 Mo.
343, 208 S.W.2d 279 (1948). See text accompanying notes 26-32 infra.
3. §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo (Supp. 1975). Although the word "divorce" is
never mentioned in Missouri's dissolution of marriage statute, the legislation was
entitled the Missouri Divorce Reform Act. See Thayer, Dissolution of Marriage
Under Missouris New Divorce Law: Introduction, 29 J. Mo. B. 496 (1973). In this
comment the word dissolution will therefore be used when referring to the court
action terminating the marital relationship, and the word divorce will be used
when referring to the legislative act.
1
Triplett: Triplett: Confidential Communications Privilege of Husband and Wife:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
A. Confidential Communications Privilege
The confidential communications privilege between husband and
wife is embodied in section 491.020, RSMo 1969. 4  Basically the
privilege provides that one spouse may not testify in court as to confi-
dential communications between the two made while they are alone.5
Absent waiver, testimony concerning such confidential communications
is inadmissible.
The basic rationale for the confidential communications privilege is
to encourage spouses to confide in one another by removing the fear
that their conversations may be later disclosed in court. 6 This rationale
effectively defines the parameters of the privilege. The statements must
be made during the marriage relationship in order to be privileged.
7
Furthermore, in order to remove effectively the fear of future disclosure
the privilege must extend beyond the termination of the relationship.8
In addition, the presence of a third party capable of understanding the
4. § 491.020, RSMo 1969, provides:
No married woman shall be disqualified as a witness in any civil suit
prosecuted in the name of or against her husband, whether joined or
not with her husband as a party; and no married man shall be dis-
qualified as a witness in any civil suit or proceeding prosecuted in the
name of or against his wife, whether he be joined with her or not as a
party; provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to au-
thorize or permit any married woman, while the relation exists, or sub-
sequently, to testify to any admission or confidential communications
of her husband, made to herself; and provided further, that nothing
in this section shall be construed to authorize or permit any married
man, while the relation exists, or subsequently, to testify to any admis-
sion or confidential communications of his wife, made to himself.
Section, 546.260, RSMo 1969, provides that the confidential communications
privilege also applies in criminal actions. See Comment, The Missouri Law of Mar-
ital Communications: Inconsistency Between Property and Divorce Cases, 1 ST. L.U.L.J.
117 (1950), where the author traces in detail the development of the Missouri
statute on confidential communications through its various stages of revision.
Procedural questions concerning who must show the communication to be
privileged are unsettled in Missouri. Compare, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 60 S.W.2d 709
(St. L. Mo. App. 1933) (the court will presume that all communications between
husband and wife are confidential until the party attacking the privilege can
show otherwise) with State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1960) (the burden of showing that the statement was confidential and
therefore within the privilege was on the person asserting the privilege).
5. Long v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668, 54 S.W. 473 (1899); Forbis v. Forbis, 274
S.W.2d 800 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Kistner v. Kistner, 89 S.W.2d 106 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1936); Tucker v. Tucker, 224 Mo. App. 669, 31 S.W.2d 238 (Spr. Ct. App.
1930). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2336 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 14 Mo. App. 418, 419 (St. L. Ct. App. 1883).
7. § 491.020, RSMo 1969. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 81 (2d ed. 1972).
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communication would seem to rebut the confidential nature of the
communication.9
Because both spouses are needed to effectuate a privileged confi-
dential communication, the privilege is said to belong to both parties.' 0
Therefore, the consent of both spouses is needed to waive the
privilege." Because the privilege belongs only to the spouses, third




The confidential communications privilege should not be confused
with the so-called "adverse-witness" privilege which also exists between
husband and wife. 3 This privilege involves the ability of a spouse to
testify for or against the other spouse in a criminal prosecution. It had
generally been thought that the defendant spouse could prevent the
other from testifying by making timely objection. 1 4 The defendant
spouse, of course, could waive this privilege.' In addition, the privilege
did not apply if the defendant spouse was charged with a crime against
the other spouse or their children.' 6
A recent Missouri case significantly clarified the law in this area. In
State v. Frazier ' 7 the court concluded that the option of testifying against
a defendant spouse lies with the witness spouse. A spouse may testify
against the defendant spouse in a criminal prosecution, even over the
objection of the defendant spouse, but may not be compelled to testify by
the prosecution."' Apparently the privilege of the witness spouse ex-
9. Schierstein v. Schierstein, 68 Mo. App. 205 (St. L. Ct. App. 1896) (pre-
sence of 9-month-old baby did not destroy privilege). See also Erickson, Testimony
by Husband and Wife in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REv. 546, 547 (1959).
10. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 7, § 83.
11. Wigmore advances the proposition that the privilege should belong only
to the communicating spouse. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2340. See also Cole-
man v. Coleman, 318 S.W.2d 378 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
12. This point has been overlooked by the courts from time to time. See, e.g.,
Henry v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407, 12 S.W. 663 (1889) (third party allowed to assert
the privilege).
13. § 546.260, RSMo 1969.
14. See State v. Kodat, 158 Mo. 125, 59 S.W. 73 (1900).
15. 8 J. WIGMORF, supra note 5, § 2242. Because the adverse witness rule is a
privilege, it is waived if not properly asserted. State v. Hill, 76 S.W.2d 1092 (Mo.
1934).
16. State v. Kollenborn, 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. En Banc 1957); State v. Pen-
nington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 S.W. 1106 (1894).
17. 550 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
18. A spouse is now a competent witness against a defendant spouse in
any criminal proceeding if the witness spouse willingly testifies; the
option of doing so belongs to the witness spouse; and a witness
spouse is permitted, but may not be compelled, to testify in any
3
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tends beyond the termination of the marital relationship as to acts com-
mitted during marriage.19
C. Spousal Disqualification
The confidential communications privilege also should be distin-
guished from the common law rule which barred either spouse from
testifying for or against the other.20  This common law disqualification
was not a true privilege because it could not be waived. Like most
states, 21 Missouri has abolished the spousal witness disqualification by
statute.
22
Because this comment is concerned with the relationship of
privileged communications to Missouri's new divorce act, only the confi-
dential communications privilege will be discussed. 23
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
A. The Property Exceptions
Missouri courts have expressed the view that the confidential com-
munications privilege between husband and wife should be jealously
guarded. 24 Nevertheless, the courts actually have been quite willing to
criminal proceeding against a defendant spouse as to any relevant
and admissible matter save confidential communications between the
spouses.
Id. at 596.
19. In Frazier the witness' testimony concerned an incident during the mar-
riage; the defendant and the witness were divorced at time of the trial. 550
S.W.2d at 592. The court did not discuss and therefore apparently did not base
its holding on the fact that the ex-wife could testify against the defendant be-
cause of the fact that the witness and the defendant were divorced at the time of
the trial. Thus, this decision could be read to mean that the privilege of a witness
spouse not to testify against a defendant spouse extends beyond the termination
of the marital relationship. Because the justification for the adverse witness
privilege is to preserve marital harmony during the relationship, commentators
were generally of the opinion that any adverse witness privilege ended when the
marriage did. See C. McCoRmici, supra note 7, § 85. However, Missouri courts
already had held that the adverse witness privilege extended beyond the termi-
nation of the marriage. State v. Kodat, 158 Mo. 125, 59 S.W. 73 (1900).
20. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2334.
21. Id.
22. § 491.020, RSMo 1969.
23. See Erickson, supra note 9, for a discussion of the differences among the
confidential communications privilege, the adverse witness privilege, and the
common law spousal disqualification.
24. .ee the leading case in Missouri on the confidential communications
privilege, Berlin v. Berlin, 52 Mo. 151 (1873), wherein Judge Sherwood stated:
Communications of husband and wife inter sese are privileged, and are
sedulously guarded by the seal of that absolute inviolability which the
law places upon the hallowed intimacies of the marital relation. So
strictly has the law, on the grounds of public policy, enforced the ob-
[Vol. 43
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create exceptions to the -privilege and admit evidence of confidential
communications in certain circumstances. Most of the cases that have
recognized an exception to the confidential communications privilege
have involved some type of dealings between the spouses that involved
property, either real or personal.25 Generally one of the spouses wishes
to testify concerning property matters in a suit for separate maintenance
and support or in a divorce proceeding, while the other claims that such
testimony is privileged and therefore inadmissible.
As a general rule, Missouri courts have been willing to admit the
testimony of one spouse concerning communications dealing with prop-
erty matters. These cases have fallen into three categories: cases involving
a joint business venture between the spouses; cases allowing the admissi-
bility of otherwise confidential communications to prevent a fraud on
the property rights of one of the spouses; and cases establishing an
agency relationship between the spouses.
1. Joint Business Ventures
The most recent Missouri case to admit testimony concerning the
confidential communications of husband and wife was Durr v. Vick. 26
The husband brought an action against his former wife to recover one-
half of the proceeds of certain promissory notes owned jointly by the
two. The wife sought to exclude certain statements made during the
marital relationship that the ownership in the note and its proceeds was
to be half and half. The court acknowledged the general rule that confi-
dential communications between husband and wife are inadmissible.
However, the court allowed the testimony into evidence and stated that
"in view of the nature of the transaction involved" the communications
were not privileged. 28
For support the Durr court cited Brooks v. Brooks.29 This 1948 case
is probably the most important case in establishing an exception to the
servance of this rule, that in no instance and for no purpose has its
infraction ever been permitted ....
Id. at 152.
25. For a discussion of the "property line" of divorce cases suggesting excep-
tions to the confidential communications privilege, see Comment, supra note 4.
See also Renard, Confutential Communications Between Husband and Wife, 3 J. Mo. B.
91 (1947).
26. 345 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1961).
27. The court recognized that the general definition of confidential com-
munications is communications between the spouses when no third parties are
present. Tucker v. Tucker, 224 Mo. App. 669, 31 S.W. 2d 238 (Spr. Ct. App.
1941). However, the court stated that this definition was "not decisive of the
question presented." 345 S.W.2d at 168.
28. 345 S.W.2d at 168.
29. 357 Mo. 343, 208 S.W.2d 279 (1948).
5
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husband-wife confidential communications privilege. 30 In Brooks a wife
sued her husband for an accounting of the proceeds of an alleged joint
business venture between the spouses. The wife sought to testify that her
husband had told her that the business would be "mine and his business,
and we would work together." 31 The court held that because the conver-
sations related primarily to business matters, they were not marital confi-
dences.32 Therefore, the testimony of the wife concerning the ownership
of the business was admitted.
In State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis,33 a suit for alienation of affections,
the court interpreted the meaning of a joint business venture rather
broadly. In Boswell production of income tax returns was sought in order
to establish the net worth of one spouse. Production of these returns was
challenged. The wife argued that because the returns were filed jointly,
they were privileged as confidential communications. Although two ear-
lier Missouri cases had held similar testimony privileged, 34 production of
the income tax returns was ordered. The court's basis for holding the
returns not privileged was that "transaction of purely business matters
are often not privileged as marital confidences ."35 Apparently the court
reasoned that because the husband and wife jointly owned a majority of
stock in a corporation, the filing of the tax return involved a business
venture.
It is clear that Missouri courts are willing to admit otherwise
privileged confidential communications if the existence of some type ofjoint business venture between the spouses is established. In addition,
Missouri courts seemed to have defined what constitutes a business ven-
ture rather broadly, although the guidelines have not been clearly estab-
lished.
30. For a detailed discussion of the facts of Brooks, see Comment, supra note
4, at 129-31.
31. 357 Mo. at 346, 208 S.W.2d at 280.
32. The conversations here involved relate primarily to business mat-
ters, not marital confidences, and are clearly a part of the res gestae.
The better reasoned cases are to the effect that in actions between
husband and wife involving property rights the rule excluding relevant
conversations between them in the absence of third persons as con-
fidential communications yields to the necessity of the situation for
the prevention of injustice and they are competent witnesses re-
specting such conversations.
Id. at 350, 208 S.W.2d at 283 (emphasis added).
33. 334 S.W.2d 757 (Spr. Mo. App. 1960).
34. Reeve v. Reeve, 160 S.W. 2d 804 (K.C. Mo. App. 1942); McPheeters v.
McPheeters, 207 Mo. App. 634, 227 S.W. 872 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921).
35. 334 S.W.2d at 763. "The only other strict privilege which the wife might
assert would be upon the ground of confidential communication. But communi-
cations between husband and wife as to transaction of purely business matters
are often not privileged as marital confidences." Professor Wigmore emphasized
that the "essence of the [confidential communications] privilege is to protect
[Vol. 43
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2. Fraud on Property Rights
Missouri courts also have been willing to admit testimony which con-
cerns marital confidences if it is necessary to prevent fraud on the mar-
ital property rights on one spouse. This ex necessitate exception to the
confidential communications privilege was first established in Henly v.
Sneed. 6 A husband and wife had been induced by fraud to execute a
deed of trust concerning a parcel of real property. The court admitted
testimony of conversations between the husband and wife concerning the
alleged fraud, even though these conversations were apparently confi-
dential. The court held that the conversations were not privileged be-
cause they constituted a part of the fraudulent conduct. 37
In Henry v. Sneed the claim that the conversations were privileged
was made by a third party rather than one of the spouses.38 The fraud
exception to the confidential communications privilege later was invoked
under similar circumstances in two subsequent cases. In Hack v. Rollins 39
and Rice v. Waddill 40 testimony concerning otherwise confidential com-
munications between husband and wife was held admissible because the
court felt that the testimony was necessary in order to prevent or expose
fraud. 41
confidences only." 8 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 5, § 2336. Wigmore cited extensively
from the leading case of Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 491-92, 105 N.W. 314,
315-16 (1905) wherein the court discussed the confidential communications
privilege:
As we have seen, the privilege is bottomed upon considerations of
public policy. Accordingly it would seem that, whatever the form of
expression adopted, no more is required than that the confidences in-
herent in the marital relation, or incident thereto, should be fully
protected .... So, too, it cannot be that the rule of privilege -must be
held to extend so far as to exclude all communications between hus-
band and wife having reference to business relations existing either as
between them directly, or as between them-one or both-and others.
Certainly as to business relations existing between husband and wife directly,
there can be no adverse consideration of public policy. Quite to the contrary,
public policy, as reflected by statute and by our decisions, permits of
such relations to the fullest extent. And it would be shocking to say
that a contract thus made, or rights or liabilities thus accruing, could
not be enforced because, forsooth, a communication between the par-
ties having relation thereto, and essential to proof, was privileged ....
(emphasis added).
36. 99 Mo. 407, 12 S.W. 663 (1889).
37. The court said that the conversations were "part of the res gestae, and on
the foot of fraud." Id. at 422, 12 S.W. at 665.
38. See text accompanying note 12 supra. See also Warrick, Evidence -Husband
and Wife-Confidential Communications, 21 U. Mo. BULL., L. SER. 40, 43 (1921).
39. 158 Mo. 182, 59 S.W. 232 (1900).
40. 168 Mo. 99, 67 S.W. 605 (1902).
41. Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 121, 67 S.W. 605, 610 (1902); Hack v. Rol-
lins, 158 Mo. 182, 190, 59 S.W. 232, 234 (1900). Both decisions cited Henry v.
7
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3. Spousal Agency Relationship
If the agency of one spouse for the other is established, testimony
concerning communications made during the agency relationship is ad-
missible. This is so even though the communications otherwise would be
privileged. Only one case clearly sets forth the agency exception. In
Darfier v. Darfier 42 a husband sought to divest his wife of title to certain
land. He offered into evidence a letter which he had written which au-
thorized his wife to buy the land in question with money he supplied.
The court held the letter admissible; testimony by the husband con-
cerning the letter also was admitted. The reason the letter was held ad-
missible, and not privileged as a confidential communication, was the
existence of an agency relationship between the spouses.
43
IV. ELIMINATION OF THE CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE IN DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS
A. Single Action Dissolution Proceedings
Until the passage of Missouri's Divorce Reform Act 4 4 in 1973, the
court in a divorce proceeding had no jurisdiction to divide property
between the parties. Thus two separate judicial proceedings often were
required to resolve all issues upon the termination of marriage. One ac-
tion was commenced in circuit court by the spouse seeking the divorce.
In this legal action, the trial judge decided only whether a divorce
should be granted to the parties. Following the divorce decree, if the
parties could not agree on a property distribution, a separate equitable
partition action or a statutory legal action was filed to resolve property
disputes. 45
Sneed as authority for the proposition that an exception to the confidential com-
munications privilege exists to prevent fraud.
One additional case, Moeckel v. Heim, 134 Mo. 576, 36 S.W. 226 (1896),
involved fraud in dealing with property and the admissibility of otherwise confi-
dential communications between husband and wife. The court admitted such
communications, citing and following Henry v. Sneed.
42. 58 Mo. 222 (1874).
43. Id. at 234. Judge Sherwood likened the letter to a power of attorney,
remarking that no one would doubt that a formal power of attorney would be
admissible. For a criticism of this reasoning, see Comment, supra note 4, at 127.
For another case holding testimony of the wife admissible after her agency for
the husband was established, see Ingerham v. Weatherman, 79 Mo. App. 480
(K.C. App. 1899). Ingerham is not very useful precedent because the court did
not clearly establish which privilege between husband and wife was applicable.
44. §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo (Supp. 1975). See Symposium: Dissolution of Mar-
riage Under Missouri's New Divorce Law, 29 J. Mo. B. 495 (1973).
45. See §§ 452.170-.240, RSMo 1969 (married woman to petition the court).
See also Sackman v. Sackman, 143 Mo. 576, 45 S.W. 264 (1898) (the divorce
petition was sufficient to start equitable action independent of statute).
[Vol. 43
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Under this two-action system, testimony involving property matters
between the spouses was not relevant in the legal proceeding for divorce.
Therefore, trial judges were not called upon to decide whether confi-
dential communications between husband and wife which dealt with
property should be admissible in a divorce action; such matters were
irrelevant. An argument that the confidential communications privilege
should not apply due to the established "property" exception would have
been totally misplaced in a divorce proceeding.
However, under the 1973 Divorce Act questions of property division
are to be resolved in the same proceeding as the issue of divorce. 46
Now that testimony involving property rights will be relevant in divorce
proceedings, Missouri practitioners are in the position to argue that the
confidential communications privilege should not apply in such actions.
The argument can be premised on the "property" exceptions to the con-
fidential communications privilege in Missouri. Because the privilege
does not apply to testimony involving property matters, at a minimum it
should not apply in divorce proceedings to testimony involving property
matters between the spouses.
In addition, a credible argument can be advanced that the confi-
dential communications privilege should not apply to any testimony in a
dissolution action. Under the new divorce act, the conduct of the parties
during the marriage is a factor to be considered by the trial judge when
distributing marital assets. 47 Thus, testimony concerning confidential
communications that would seem to bear only on the issue whether the
marriage should be dissolved or the amount of maintenance to be
awarded also would be relevant in deciding how the marital property is
to be divided.
Therefore, under Missouri's new divorce act the entire dissolution
proceeding involves matters relevant to property division. Missouri cases
have established that confidential communications involving property
matters are not privileged. Missouri courts therefore should eliminate
the application of the privilege in dissolution actions. This would make
available to the courts all the information necessary for proper adminis-
tration of the new divorce act.
B. Partnership Theory of Marriage
Further support for the argument that the confidential communica-
tions privilege should not apply in dissolution actions is provided by the
conceptual changes in the marital relationship brought about by the new
divorce act. Missouri's new divorce act is based on the Uniform Marriage
46. See § 452.330.1, RSMo (Supp. 1975). See also Krauskopf & Fowler, Disso-
lution of Marriage Under Missouri's New Divorce Law: Property Provisions, 29 J. Mo.
B. 508, 510 (1973).
47. § 452.330.1(4), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
9
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and Divorce Act. 48 This new act changes the relationship of husband
and wife for purposes of accumulating and distributing assets during the
marriage to that of equal partners in a shared enterprise-type relation-
ship.49
Section 452.330, RSMo (Supp. 1975) controls matters of property
distribution incident to divorce. 50  This section is based on section 307
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, as originally approved by the
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in 1970. Most commentators
agree that section 307 of the Uniform Act creates a community property
rule for the division of marital property upon dissolution.5 1
By suggesting the adoption of section 307, the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws were not attempting to force an entire community
property scheme upon common law property jurisdictions. Rather, their
intent seems to have been to reflect a shared enterprise or partnership
theory of marriage and the accumulation of marital assets.12 This
shared enterprise or partnership theory of marriage is, of course, the
essence of community property law.55 The Commissioners forthrightly
recommended that the "distribution of property upon the termination of
marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of
assets incident to a dissolution of a partnership." 54 Thus, section 307
was meant to reflect not only community property concepts, but also the
shared enterprise or partnership theory of the marriage relationship.
Because of the widespread acceptance of the value of a partnership
theory of marriage, one commentator has suggested that "it is fair to
assume" that the Missouri legislature intended to incorporate the
partnership concept of marriage into Missouri law when they adopted
48. Thayer, supra note 3, at 496.
49. See Krauskopf, A Theory for 'Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri,
41 Mo. L. REv. 165 (1976).
50. This section provides that "the court shall set apart to each spouse his
property and shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court
deems just after considering all relevant factors .... " § 452.330.1, RSMo (Supp.
1975). The factors set forth in the statute are:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the divi-
sion of property is to become effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasona-
ble periods to the spouse having custody of any children; and
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage.
51. FAMILi LAW REPORTER, DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND Di-
VORCE ACT 57 (1974); Brown, Dissolution of Marriage -Personal Injury Damages as
Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 603, 604 (1976).
52. Krauskopf, supra note 49, at 166.
53. Id.
54. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, 178 (1970).
[Vol. 43
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section 307. 55 Missouri's version of section 307 limits the class of divisi-
ble property to "marital property." However, this fact highlights the in-
tent to adopt partnership concepts of marriage into Missouri law by
limiting divisible property to that which is acquired through the joint
efforts of both spouses during the marriage. 56
Missouri courts have acknowledged the partnership theory of the
marital relationship. In two recent appellate court decisions, In re Mar-
riage of Cornell 57 and Corder v. Corder,58 the partnership theory of mar-
riage was discussed in reference to property divisions. These two cases
can be read as authority that Missouri is on its way to adopting a
partnership theory of marriage for property acquisition purposes.
By accepting a partnership theory of marriage, Missouri courts have
strengthened the argument for eliminating the confidential communica-
tions privilege in dissolution actions. If spouses are "partners" in the
shared enterprise of collecting marital assets, communications concern-
ing such marital property should be admissible under the joint enter-
prise exception to the confidential communications rule. The Missouri
cases which have admitted confidential communications by use of this
exception would serve as specific authority for this proposition.5 9
C. Intent of Parties
In distributing assets incident to dissolution of marriage, Missouri
trial judges are directed to "set apart to each spouse his property." 60
In essence, this means that the court is to set aside the separate property
of each spouse and divide only the marital property. In so doing the
judge must decide what is and what is not marital property.
Missouri courts have recognized that the intent of the spouses can de-
termine whether assets are marital or separate property.6 1 If such an
intent on the part of the spouses can control, then communications be-
tween the spouses to the effect that "this will be ours together" or "ev-
erything will be 50-50" 62 should be admissible in divorce actions even
though confidential. It can be argued that such statements already are
admissible in order to prevent a fraud on the property rights of a
spouse.
63
55. Krauskopf, supra note 49, at 171.
56. Krauskopf, supra note 49, at 173.
57. 550 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
58. 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
59. See text accompanying notes 26-35 supra.
60. § 452.330.1, RSMo (Supp. 1975). See note 50 supra.
61. Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975). See also
Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Stark v. Stark, 539
S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
62. See Estate of Raphael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 206 P.2d 391 (1949) (such a
statement admissible under California's "pillow talk" rule).
63. See text accompanying notes 36-41 infra.
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D. Trend Toward Restrictive Application of the Privilege
Another possible argument for the elimination of the confidential
communications privilege in dissolution actions is the tendency of Mis-
souri courts to limit the application of the privilege whenever possible.
The courts have been willing to eliminate the application of the privilege
whenever justified by sound reason. This willingness has been evident in
cases involving verbal assaults. This type of case generally involves the
use of threatening or abusive language by one spouse against the other.
Strictly speaking, such verbal assaults if made between the spouses while
they are alone would constitute privileged communications and therefore
be inadmissible in a dissolution proceeding.
6 4
Missouri courts have held, however, that such communications are
admissible to prove indignities inflicted upon a spouse. 65 These courts
did not feel particularly constrained by the confidential communications
privilege and were ready to find exceptions to the privilege to avoid
unjust results. Although the question of the admissibility of such verbal
assaults is far from settled, recent Missouri cases have indicated such
communications may be admissible. 66
This willingness on the part of Missouri courts to create exceptions
to the confidential communications privilege shows a judicial desire to
limit the application of the privilege. Because the existing property ex-
ceptions to the privilege give Missouri courts a ground on which to limit
application of the privilege in dissolution actions, such action should be
taken to prevent unjust results.
V. LEGISLATION
Legislation in Missouri and other states has affected the application
of the confidential communications privilege in certain situations. Such
legislation lias tended to restrict rather than expand the privilege. In
deciding whether Missouri courts should apply the confidential com-
64. See, e.g., Gruner v. Gruner, 183 Mo. App. 157, 165 S.W. 865 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1914); Schierstein v. Schierstein, 68 Mo. App. 205 (St. L. Ct. App. 1896);
Brown v. Brown, 53 Mo. App. 453 (K.C. Ct. App. 1893); Ayers v. Ayers, 28 Mo.
App. 97 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887); Miller v. Miller, 14 Mo. App. 418 (St. L. Ct. App.
1883); Vogel v. Vogel, 13 Mo. App. 588 (St. L. Ct. App. 1883).
65. See, e.g., Meyer v. Meyer, 158 Mo. App. 29, 138 S.W. 70 (St. L. Ct. App.
1911); Schweikert v. Schweikert, 108 Mo. App. 477, 83 S.W. 1095 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1904); Maget v. Maget, 85 Mo. App. 6 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900). Meyer and
Maget originally set forth the "verbal assault" exception to the confidential com-
munications privilege. Early Missouri opinions did not consider this exception as
law and held that Meyer and Maget had been "practically overruled" by Gruner v.
Gruner, 183 Mo. App. 157, 165 S.W. 65 (St. L. Ct. App. 1914).
66. See Oliver v. Oliver, 325 S.W.2d 33 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959) (dictum);
Coleman v. Coleman, 318 S.W.2d 378 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958) (dictum); Sellars v.
Sellars, 274 S.W.2d 509 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955) (dictum).
[Vol. 43246
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munications privilege in dissolution actions, this legislative trend should
be given consideration.
A. Legislation in Other States
1. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act States
According to the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws there are
now six states, excluding Missouri, that have adopted some form of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.67 These six states are Arizona, 68
Colorado,69 Georgia,7 0 Kentucky, 71 Montana, 7 and Washington. 73 All
six of these states statutorily recognize a confidential communications
privilege between husband and wife that is similar to the Missouri
privilege.7 4
However, five of these six states have enacted specific legislation
which has effectively eliminated the use of the confidential communica-
tions privilege in dissolution actions . 7  This has been accomplished in
four states by making the privilege inapplicable in any civil action or
proceeding between the spouses. 76 The remaining state simply pro-
vided that the privilege does not apply in divorce actions. 77  Missouri
and Georgia remain the only states that have adopted some form of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act without statutorily eliminating the
application of the confidential communications privilege in dissolution
actions.
2. Community Property States
Because Missouri has adopted a community property-type scheme
for property distribution incident to dissolution of marriage,7 8 examina-
67. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, Table VII, at 414 (1975).
68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-301 to 328 (Supp. 1977).
69. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 14-10-101 to 133 (1974).
70. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-101 to 134 (Supp. 1977).
71. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 403.010-.350 (Supp. 1976).
72. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 48-301 to 341 (Supp. 1977).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.101-.902 (Supp. 1977).
74. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2232 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107
(1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (1974); Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.210(1) (1972);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93.701-4 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060 (Supp. 1977).
75. The only state besides Missouri that has not statutorily eliminated the
application of the confidential communications privilege in divorce actions is
Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (1969).
76. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2232 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1974);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-701-4 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060 (Supp. 1977).
77. Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.210(1) (1972).
78. See text accompanying notes 50 & 51 supra.
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tion of the treatment of the confidential communications privilege in
community property states is also in order. At present there are eight
community property states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.79 All except Louisiana 8 0
and New Mexico 81 have a statutory confidential communications
privilege between husband and wife.
8 2
Of the six community property states that have a statutory confi-
dential communications privilege, all but Texas have specifically pro-
vided that the privilege does not apply in civil actions between the
spouses.8 3 This would of course include divorce actions. Thus, of the
eight community property states only one, Texas, still applies the confi-
dential communications privilege in dissolution actions.
B. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
As noted earlier, the basic rationale for the confidential com-
munications privilege is to encourage spouses to confide in one
another without fear of future disclosure of such communications.8 4
This rationale seems to be firmly grounded in Missouri's case law and
may serve as the primary argument against eliminating the application
of the confidential communications privilege in dissolution actions.8"
However, the Missouri legislature already has seen fit to eliminate
the application of the confidential communications privilege in actions
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
79. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 57
(2d ed. 1971).
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3665 (West 1968). The omission of any men-
tion of the confidential communications privilege from the statute concerning
the competency of witnesses in civil cases has caused some commentators to
wonder if the omission was deliberate or simply an oversight. Note, 14 LA. L.
REV. 427, 430 n.22 (1954). Apparently, since the statute has not been revised, the
omission was intentional.
81. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12 (1975). New Mexico's statute provides that a
spouse cannot be compelled to disclose communications between the spouses while
they are married, but apparently such spouse may do so voluntarily.
82. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-2232 (1956); CAL. EvID. CODE § 980 (West .1966);
IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1977); NEV. Rzv. STAT. § 48-040 (1966); TEX. CRIM.
PRO. CODE ANN. § 38-11 (Vernon 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 5.60.060
(Supp. 1977).
83. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2232 (1956); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 981-84 (West
1966); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.040 (1966);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1977). Two of these five states, Arizona
and Washington, have also enacted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in
some form. See authorities cited note 76 supra.
84. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
85. The validity of this rationale has been doubted for some time. See
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13
MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929). But see Comment, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Tes-
timonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 208, 219 (1961).
[Vol. 43
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(U.R.E.S.A.). 86 This legislation effectively rebuts any strong public pol-
icy in favor of the continued application of the confidential communica-
tions privilege in Missouri. It is difficult to justify the application of the
privilege in regular dissolution proceedings but not in actions under
U.R.E.S.A. Both proceedings can involve significant amounts of tes-
timony concerning the marital relationship and spousal communications.
If confidential communications are admissible in actions under
U.R.E.S.A., such communications should also be admissible in actions
under the Divorce Reform Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Missouri courts have formulated three interrelated exceptions to the
application of the confidential communications privilege. All three ex-
ceptions apply when the otherwise confidential communication deals
primarily with property matters. It is submitted that because proceedings
under the new divorce act are permeated with property questions, the
confidential communications privilege should not apply in divorce ac-
tions. Additional support for this proposition is found in the partnership
theory of marriage inherent in the new divorce act, and the willingness
of Missouri's courts to limit the application of the confidential communi-
cations privilege when possible.
Missouri courts are in a position to remove the application of the
confidential communications privilege in divorce proceedings and should
do so. If the courts are hesitant, the same result could be accomplished
through specific legislation. Such legislation barring the application of
the privilege in divorce actions would bring Missouri in line with the
majority of community property states and states with divorce acts simi-
lar to that of Missouri. Legislation in Missouri already has made the con-
fidential communications privilege inapplicable in actions under
U.R.E.S.A. Legislation of this type could be extended to cover all disso-
lution actions.8 7
TIMOTHY W. TRIPLETT
86. § 454.210, RSMo 1969.
87. Professor McCormick, after stating his doubts concerning a valid need
for the confidential communications privilege, especially in light of the dispro-
portionate harm the privilege may cause to the administration of justice, con-
cluded:
[The wider solution] is to recognize, by statute, rule of court or deci-
sion, that the privilege is not absolute but a qualified one, which must
yield if the trial judge finds that the evidence of the communication is
required in the due administration of justice. The judge could then
protect the marital confidence when it should be protected, namely,
when the material fact sought to be established by the communication
is not substantially controverted and may be proven with reasonable
convenience by other evidence.
C. McCoRMICK, supra note 7, at § 86.
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